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Abstract
Consider a channel where authorized transmitter Jack sends packets to authorized receiver Steve according
to a Poisson process with rate λ packets per second for a time period T . Suppose that covert transmitter Alice
wishes to communicate information to covert receiver Bob on the same channel without being detected by a
watchful adversary Willie. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that warden Willie cannot
look at packet contents but rather can only observe packet timings, and Alice must send information by inserting
her own packets into the channel. We show that the number of packets that Alice can covertly transmit to Bob
is on the order of the square root of the number of packets that Jack transmits to Steve; conversely, if Alice
transmits more than that, she will be detected by Willie with high probability. In the second scenario, we assume
that Willie can look at packet contents but that Alice can communicate across an M/M/1 queue to Bob by
altering the timings of the packets going from Jack to Steve. First, Alice builds a codebook, with each codeword
consisting of a sequence of packet timings to be employed for conveying the information associated with that
codeword. However, to successfully employ this codebook, Alice must always have a packet to send at the
appropriate time. Hence, leveraging our result from the first scenario, we propose a construction where Alice
covertly slows down the packet stream so as to buffer packets to use during a succeeding codeword transmission
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phase. Using this approach, Alice can covertly and reliably transmit O(λT ) covert bits to Bob in time period T
over an M/M/1 queue with service rate µ > λ.
Keywords: Covert Bits Through Queues, Covert Communication, Covert Communication over Queues,
Covert Computer Network, Covert Wired Communication, Low Probability of Detection, LPD, Covert
Channel, Covert Timing Channel, Covert Packet Insertion, Poisson Point Process, Information Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The provisioning of security and privacy is critical in modern communication systems. The vast
majority of research in this area has focused on protecting the message content through encryption [2] or
emerging methods in information-theoretic security [3]. However, there are applications where the very
existence of the message must be hidden from a watchful adversary. For example, in the organization of
social unrest against an authoritarian regime, the mere existence of an encrypted message would likely
lead to the shut down of that communication and possible punishment of the users. Other applications
include hiding the presence or scale of military operations, or removing the ability of users to be tracked
in their everyday activities.
Whereas the provisioning of undetectable communications in objects with symbols drawn from
a finite field and transmitted over noiseless channels (e.g. images) has been extensively studied in
the steganogaphic community over a number of years [4], the consideration of hiding messages on
continuous-valued noisy channels has only recently drawn considerable attention. In particular, despite
the extensive historical use of spread spectrum systems for low probability of detection (LPD) com-
munications, the fundamental limits of covert communications over the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel were only recently obtained [5], [6]. The work of [5], [6] motivated significant further
work (e.g. [7]–[19]), with these works taken together providing an almost complete characterization
of the foundational limits of covert communications over discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) and
AWGN channels.
In this paper, we turn our attention to the consideration of a covert timing channel appropriate
for packet-based communication channels, e.g., computer networks. More specifically, we study how
packet insertion or inter-packet delays can be used for covert communications. The use of inter-packet
delays for covert communication was first explored by Girling [20] and was later studied by a number of
other authors [21]–[24]. In particular, Anantharam et al. [25] derived the Shannon capacity of the timing
channel with a single-server queue, and Dunn et al. [26] analyzed the secrecy capacity of such a system.
Considerable work has focused on quantifying and optimizing the capacity of timing channels [27]–
[32] by leveraging information theoretic analysis and the use of various coding techniques [33]–[35].
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Moreover, methods for detecting timing channels [36] as well as eluding the detection by leveraging
the statistical properties of the legitimate channel have been proposed [37].
In this paper, we consider a channel where an authorized (overt) transmitter, Jack, sends packets to
an authorized (overt) receiver, Steve, within a time period T , where the timings of packet transmission
are modeled by a Poisson point process with rate λ packets per second. Covert transmitter Alice may
wish to transmit data to a covert receiver, Bob, on this channel in the presence of a warden, Willie, who
is monitoring the channel between Alice and Bob precisely to detect such transmissions. We consider
two scenarios in detail. In the first scenario, we assume: (1) the warden Willie is not able to see packet
contents, and therefore cannot verify the authenticity of the packets (e.g., whether they are actually sent
by Jack); and (2) Alice is restricted to packet insertion. Willie is aware that the timing of the packets
of the overt communication link follows a Poisson point process with rate λ, so he seeks to apply
hypothesis testing to verify whether the packet process has the proper characteristics. We show that (see
Theorem 1) if Alice decides to transmit O
(√
λT
)
packets to Bob, she can keep Willie’s sum of error
probabilities PFA + PMD > 1 −  for any 0 <  < 1, where PFA and PMD are Willie’s probability of
false alarm and missed detection, respectively. Conversely, we prove that if Alice transmits ω
(√
λT
)
packets, she will be detected by Willie with high probability.
In the second scenario, we assume that Willie can look at packet contents and therefore can verify
packets’ authenticity. Thus, Alice is not able to insert packets, but we allow Alice in this scenario
to alter the packet timings to convey information to Bob, whom is receiving the packets through a
M/M/1 queue with service rate µ > λ. To do such, Alice designs an efficient code [25], where a
codeword consists of a sequence of packet timings drawn from the same process as the overt traffic;
hence, a codeword transmitted with those packet timings is undetectable. However, there is a causality
constraint, as Alice clearly cannot send the next packet (i.e. codeword symbol) unless she has a packet
from the Jack to Steve link available to transmit. This suggests the following two-stage process. In
the first stage, Alice covertly slows down the transmission of the packets from Jack to Steve so as to
buffer some number of packets. In the second stage, Alice continues to add packets transmitted by Jack
to her buffer while releasing packets with the inter-packet delay appropriate for the chosen codeword.
Alice’s scheme breaks down when her buffer is empty at any point before completing the codeword
transmission. Hence, the question becomes: how long must Alice collect packets during the first stage
so as to guarantee (with high probability) that she will not run out of packets before the completion of
codeword transmission during the second stage?
First in Lemma 1, we show that Alice can collect and store O
(√
λT
)
packets in an interval of length
T while keeping Willie’s sum of error probabilities PFA+PMD > 1− for any 0 <  < 1; conversely, if
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she collects more, she will be detected by Willie with high probability. Building on Lemma 1, we prove
(Theorem 2) that, using our two-stage covert communications approach, Alice can reliably transmit
O(λT ) covert bits to Bob within the time period T while keeping Willie’s sum of error probabilities
bounded as PFA + PMD > 1−  for any 0 <  < 1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and
the metrics employed for the two scenarios of interest. Then, we provide constructions and their analysis
for the two covert communication scenarios in Sections III and IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
A. System Model
Suppose that Jack transmit packets to Steve on the interval [0, T ]. We model the packet transmission
times by a Poisson point process with parameter λ. Hence, the average number of packets that is
sent from Jack to Steve in a duration of time T is λT . Assume Alice wishes to use the channel to
communicate with Bob without being detected by warden Willie, whom is observing the channel from
Alice to Bob and attempting to detect any covert transmissions.
In Scenario 1, which is analyzed in Section III, we assume that Willie does not have access to the
contents of the packets and therefore is not able to perform authentication and determine whether a
packet is from Jack or not. We assume that Alice, with knowledge of λ, is allowed to use the channel
only by inserting and transmitting her own packets to Bob, and Bob is able to authenticate, receive and
remove the covert packets. Therefore Steve does not observe the covert packets. We consider the rate ∆ at
which Alice can insert packets while remaining covert. Willie knows that the legitimate communication
is modeled by a Poisson point process with parameter λ, and he knows all of the characteristics of
Alice’s insertion scheme (rate, method of insertion, etc.)
In Scenario 2, which is analyzed in Section IV, we assume that Willie is able to access packet contents
and hence authenticate whether a packet is coming from Jack. Hence, Alice is not able to insert packets
into the channel. However, we allow Alice to buffer packets and release them when she desires into the
channel, thereby enabling covert communication through packet timing control. The problem is made
non-trivial by assuming that Bob has access to the resulting packet stream only through an M/M/1
queue with service rate µ > λ; in other words, the service times of the packets are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables according to an exponential random variable with
average 1/µ. Again, Willie knows that the legitimate communication is modeled by a Poisson point
process with parameter λ, and he knows all of the characteristics of Alice’s packet buffering and release
scheme except a secret key that is pre-shared between Alice and Bob. Fig. 2 depicts the system model
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Fig. 1. System configuration for Scenario 1: Alice adds her packets to the channel between Jack and Steve to communicate covertly with
Bob. The average number of packets from Jack in a duration of time T is λT , and the average number of total packets observed by either
Bob and Willie in T is (λ+ ∆)T . The blue color shows the legitimate communication and the green shows the covert communication.
Fig. 2. System configuration for Scenario 2: Alice is able to buffer packets in order to alter packet timings.
for this scenario. In this scenario, we consider the rate at which Alice can reliably transmit information
to Bob without detection by Willie.
B. Hypothesis Testing
Willie is faced with a binary hypothesis test: the null hypothesis (H0) corresponds to the case that Alice
is not transmitting, and the alternative hypothesis H1 corresponds to the case that Alice is transmitting.
We denote the distribution Willie observes under H1 by P1, and the distribution Willie observes under
H0 by P0. Also, we denote by PFA the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true (type I error or false
alarm), and PMD the probability of rejecting H1 when it is true (type II error or missed detection). We
assume that Willie uses classical hypothesis testing with equal prior probabilities and seeks to minimize
PFA + PMD; the generalization to arbitrary prior probabilities is straightforward [6].
C. Covertness
Alice’s transmission is covert if and only if she can lower bound Willie’s sum of probabilities of
error (PFA + PMD) by 1−  for any  > 0 [6].
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D. Reliability
A transmission scheme is reliable if and only if the probability that a codeword transmission from
Alice to Bob is unsuccessful is upper bounded by ζ for any ζ > 0. Note that this metric applies only
in Scenario 2.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION VIA PACKET INSERTION (SCENARIO 1)
In this section, we consider Scenario 1: Willie cannot authenticate packets to see whether they are
from Jack or Alice, and Alice is only allowed to send information to Bob by adding packets to the
channel.
Theorem 1. Consider Scenario 1. Alice can covertly insert O(√λT ) packets in the period of time T .
Conversely, if Alice attempts to insert ω
(√
λT
)
packets in the period of time T , there exists a detector
that Willie can use to detect her with arbitrarily low sum of error probabilities PFA + PMD.
Proof. (Achievability)
Construction: Alice generates a Poisson point process with parameter ∆ and based on this, adds her
covert packets to the channel between Jack and Steve. Bob collects and removes the packets generated
by Alice.
Analysis: First we show that the number of packets observed during the time period of length T is
a sufficient statistic by which Willie can perform the optimal hypothesis test to decide whether Alice
is transmitting or not. The observation of the Poisson point process at Willie is characterized by the
collection of inter-packet delays. Let x¯ = (x1, x2, · · · ) be this observation vector, where xi is the delay
between the arrival time of packet i and packet i+1. The optimal hypothesis test is based on a likelihood
ratio (LRT) between the null hypothesis H0 (Alice is not transmitting) and the alternative hypothesis
H1 (Alice is transmitting):
Λ(x¯) =
f(x¯|H1)
f(x¯|H0) =
∑
n1
f(x¯|H1, n1)P1(n1)∑
n0
f(x¯|H0, n0)P0(n0)
where P0 is the probability distribution function for the number of packets that Willie observes under
the null hypothesis H0 (Alice is not transmitting) corresponding to a Poisson point process with rate
λ, and P1 is the probability distribution function for the number of packets that Willie observes under
hypothesis H1 (Alice is transmitting) corresponding to a Poisson point process with rate λ+ ∆. Since
the processes under H0 and H1 are Poisson, f (x¯ |H0, n) = f(x¯|H1, n) for all n, and
Λ(x¯) =
∑
n1
f(x¯|n1)P1(n1)∑
n0
f(x¯|n0)P0(n0) (1)
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Suppose that x¯ has n non-zero entries for a given observation. Since f(x¯|n1) = 0 when n1 6= n,
Λ(x¯) =
f(x¯|n)P1(n)
f(x¯|n)P0(n) =
P1(n)
P0(n)
(2)
Therefore, the number of packets that Willie observes during time interval T is a sufficient statistic for
Willie’s decision.
Now, Willie applies the optimal hypothesis test on the number of packets during time T . Then [6]
PFA + PMD ≥ 1−
√
1
2
D(P0||P1) (3)
PFA + PMD ≥ 1−
√
1
2
D(P1||P0) (4)
where E[·] denotes the expected value, and D(P0||P1) is the relative entropy between P0 and P1.
We next show how Alice can lower bound the sum of average error probabilities by upper bounding√
1
2
D(P0||P1). Consider the following fact (proved in the Appendix):
Fact 1. For two Poisson distributions Pλ1(n), Pλ2(n):
D(Pλ1(n)||Pλ2(n)) = λ2 − λ1 + λ1 log λ1/λ2 (5)
By Fact. 1, for the given P1 and P0 the relative entropy is:
D(P0||P1) = ∆ · T − λT ln
(
1 +
∆
λ
)
(6)
We prove in the Appendix that:
ln(1 + u) ≥ u− u
2
2
for u ≥ 0, (7)
Applying (7) on (6) yields:
D(P0||P1) ≤ ∆
2
λ
T. (8)
Suppose Alice sets
∆ =
√
2λ
T
 (9)
where 0 <  < 1 is a constant. Then, √
1
2
D(P0||P1) ≤ 
and E[PFA + PMD] ≥ 1−  as long as ∆ · T = O
(√
λT
)
.
(Converse) To establish the converse, we provide an explicit detector for Willie that is sufficient to
limit Alice’s throughput across all potential transmission schemes (i.e. not necessarily insertion according
to a Poisson point process). Suppose that Willie observes a time interval of length T and wishes to
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detect whether Alice is transmitting or not. Since he knows that the packet arrival process for the link
between Jack and Steve is a Poisson point process with parameter λ, he knows the expected number of
packets that he will observe. Therefore, he counts the number of packets S in this duration of time and
performs a hypothesis test by setting a threshold U and comparing S with λT + U . If S < λT + U ,
Willie accepts H0; otherwise, he accepts H1. Consider PFA
PFA = P (S > λT + U |H0) = P (S − λT > U |H0) ≤ P (|S − λT | > U |H0) (10)
When H0 is true, Willie observes a Poisson point process with parameter λ; hence,
E [S |H0 ] = λT (11)
Var [S |H0 ] = λT (12)
Therefore, applying Chebyshev’s inequality on (10) yields PFA ≤ λTU2 . Thus, Willie can achieve PFA ≤ α
for any 0 < α < 1 if he sets U =
√
λT
α
. Next, we will show that if Alice transmits ∆ · T = ω
(√
λT
)
covert packets, she will be detected by Willie with high probability. Consider PMD
PMD = P (S ≤ λT + U |H1) = P (S − (λ+ ∆)T ≤ U −∆ · T |H1)
= P (− (S − (λ+ ∆)T ) ≥ − (U −∆ · T ) |H1)
≤ P (|S − (λ+ ∆)T | ≥ |U −∆ · T | |H1) (13)
When H1 is true, since Willies observes a Poisson point process with parameter λ+ ∆,
E [S |H1 ] = (λ+ ∆)T (14)
Var [S |H1 ] = (λ+ ∆)T (15)
Therefore, applying Chebyshev’s inequality on (13) yields PMD ≤ (λ+∆)T(U−∆·T )2 . Since U =
√
λT
α
, if Alice
sets ∆ · T = ω
(√
λT
)
, Willie can achieve PMD < β for any 0 < β < 1. Combined with the results
for probability of false alarm above, if Alice sets ∆.T = ω
(√
λT
)
, Willie can choose a U =
√
λT
α
to
achieve any (small) α > 0 and β > 0 desired. 
IV. COVERT TIMING CHANNEL USING INTER-PACKET DELAYS (SCENARIO 2)
In this section, we consider Scenario 2: Willie can authenticate packets to determine whether or not
they were generated by the legitimate transmitter Jack. Therefore, Alice cannot insert packets into the
channel; rather, we assume that Alice is able to buffer packets and release them when she desires; hence,
she can encode information in the inter-packet delays by using a secret codebook shared with Bob.
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In the construction below, each of Alice’s codewords will consist of a sequence of inter-packet delays
to be employed to convey the corresponding message. But this immediately presents a problem for
Alice, as she must have a packet in her buffer to transmit at the appropriate time. To clarify this issue,
suppose Alice were to attempt to start codeword transmission immediately. Suppose that the first letter
of Alice’s codeword for the current message is 10µs, and thus she has to apply this delay between the
first and second packet. To send this letter, Alice receives the first packet from Jack and immediately
transmits it to Bob. Then, she waits for the second packet. If the second packet arrives earlier than 10µs,
she stores the packet and transmits it 10µs after the first transmission. But, if the second packet arrives
from Jack after the 10µs interval, she cannot accurately transmit the codeword. Hence, the codeword
failure rate would be quite high with such a scheme.
This suggests that Alice must build up some number of packets in her buffer before starting codeword
transmission, and, in fact, this is the scheme that we employ. In particular, Alice will employ a two-
phase system. In the first phase, she will (slightly) slow down the transmission of packets from Jack
to Steve so as to build up a backlog of packets in her buffer. Then, during the codeword transmission
phase, she will release packets from her buffer with the inter-packet delays prescribed by the codeword
corresponding to the message, while continuing to buffer arriving packets from Jack. Two questions
dictate the resulting throughput of the scheme: (1) Phase I: how much can Alice slow down the packet
stream from Jack to Steve without it being detected by warden Willie?; (2) Phase II: how many packets
must Alice accumulate in her buffer by the start of Phase II so as to, with high probability, have a packet
in her buffer at all of the times required by the codeword? To answer the first question, we calculate
the number of packets that Alice can covertly collect by slowing down the packet stream from Jack
to Steve in a duration of time T and present the results in Lemma 1. Then, in Theorem 2, we answer
the second question to present an achievability result for the number of bits that Alice can reliably and
covertly transmit to Bob through packet timings.
Lemma 1. If Alice can buffer packets on the link from Jack to Steve, she can covertly buffer O(√λT )
packets in a period of time of length T . Conversely, if Alice buffers ω
(√
λT
)
packets in the period of
time T , there exists a detector that Willie can use to detect such buffering with arbitrarily low sum of
error probabilities PFA + PMD.
Proof. For the achievability result, Alice buffers packets by slowing down the incoming process of rate
λ to one of rate λ−∆ (i.e. slightly scaling up the packet timings) and buffering the packets of the (faster:
of rate λ) incoming process that have yet to exit the buffer by the (slower: of rate λ − ∆) outgoing
process. P0 is the probability distribution function for Willie’s observation under the null hypothesis H0
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and corresponds to a Poisson point process with rate λ, and P1 is the probability distribution function
for observations under the hypothesis H1 and corresponds to a Poisson point process with rate λ−∆.
Similar to (6), by Fact 1:
D(P1||P0) = ∆ · T − (λ−∆)T ln
(
1 +
∆
λ−∆
)
(a)
≤ ∆ · T − (λ−∆)T
(
∆
λ−∆ −
1
2
(
∆
λ−∆
)2)
= ∆ · T − T
(
∆− ∆
2
2(λ−∆)
)
=
T∆2
2(λ−∆) (16)
where (a) follows from inequality (7). If ∆ = 
√
2λ/ , then D(P1||P0) ≤ 22 as T → ∞. Therefore,
by (4) and (16), Alice can achieve PFA +PMD ≥ 1−  as for any 0 <  < 1 long as ∆ ·T = 
√
2λT =
O
(√
λT
)
. The proof of the converse follows that of Theorem 1 with minor modifications. 
Theorem 2. Consider Scenario 2. By embedding information in the inter-packet delays, Alice can can
covertly and reliably transmit O (λT ) bits to Bob in a time interval of length T .
Proof. Construction: To establish covert communication over the timing channel, Alice and Bob share
a secret key (codebook) to which Willie does not have access. To build a codebook, a set of M
independently generated codewords {C(Wl)}l=Ml=1 are generated for messages {Wl}l=Ml=1 according to
realizations of a Poisson process with parameter λ that mimics the overt traffic on the channel between
Jack and Steve, where M is defined later. In particular, to generate a codeword C(Wl), first a random
variable N is generated according to a Poisson distribution with mean λT . Then, N inter-packet delays
are generated by placing N points uniformly and independently on an interval of length T [25] (see
Fig. 3). For each message transmission, Alice uses a new codebook to encode the message into a
codeword. According to the codebook, each message corresponds to a codeword that is a series of
inter-packet delays. To send a codeword, Alice applies the inter-packet delays to the packets that are
being transmitted from Jack to Steve.
Per above, Alice’s communication includes two phases: a buffering phase and a transmission phase.
During the buffering phase of length ψT , where 0 < ψ < 1 is a parameter to be defined later, Alice
slows down the packet transmission process to λ − ∆ in order to build up packets in her buffer. In
particular, Alice’s purpose in the first phase is to buffer enough packets to ensure she will not run out
of packets during the transmission phase, of length T ′ = (1− ψ)T , with high probability (see Fig. 4).
Analysis: (Covertness) Suppose that Willie knows when each of the two phases start and end.
According to Lemma 1, during the first phase, Alice can lower bound the sum of Willie’s error probability
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Fig. 3. Codebook generation: Alice and Bob share a codebook (secret), which specifies the sequence of inter-packet delays corresponding
to each message. To generate each codeword, a number N is generated according to the Poisson distribution with parameter λT , and
then N points are placed uniformly and randomly on the time interval [0, T ].
Fig. 4. Two-phased construction: Alice divides the duration of time T into two phases with lengths ψT and (1−ψ)T . In the first phase,
Alice slows down the transmission to λ − ∆ and buffers the excess packets. In the next phase, she transmits packets to Bob at rate λ
according to the inter-packet delays in the codeword corresponding to the message to be transmitted.
by 1−  and collect m = ∆ · ψT packets. Thus, in this phase, Alice’s buffering is covert. By (9),
m = 
√
2λψT (17)
During the second phase, the packet timings corresponding to the selected codeword are an instantiation
of a Poisson point process with rate λ and hence the traffic pattern is indistinguishable from the pattern
that Willie expects on the link from Jack to Steve. Hence, the scheme is covert.
(Reliability) Next we show that Alice will have a reliable communication to Bob. The notion of
reliability is tied to two events. First, Bob should be able to decode the message with arbitrarily low
probability of error, which follows by adapting the coding scheme of [25]. Second, Alice needs to
avoid a “failure” event, in which Alice is unable to create the packet timings for the selected codeword
because she has run out of packets in her buffer at some point in the codeword transmission process.
Therefore, in the transmission phase, we need to demonstrate that Alice can achieve Pf < ζ for any
ζ > 0, where Pf is probability of the event “failure”.
Suppose that Alice has accumulated m packets and wishes to communicate with Bob during an
interval of length T ′. There are two processes which impact the probability of running out of packets
in Alice’s buffer: the transmission of packets to Bob and the reception of packets from Jack (that are
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intended for Steve). Each of these processes is a Poisson point process with parameter λ. Consider
the union of these two processes as a single process, termed “T-R Process”. The T-R Process is a
Poisson point process with parameter 2λ. Note that the probability of an event in this aggregate process
corresponding to Alice buffering a packet is the same as the probability that it corresponds to her
sending a packet to convey the next code symbol. Therefore, we toss a fair coin for each packet; if it
is heads, Alice buffers a received packet; otherwise, she releases a packet from her buffer.
Let K be the total number of received and transmitted packets during interval T ′.
Pf = P (F ∩ {K > 4λT ′}) + P (F ∩ {K ≤ 4λT ′}) (18)
≤ P (K ≥ 4λT ′) + P (F ∩ {K ≤ 4λT ′}) (19)
where F is the “failure” event, and (18) is due to the law of total probability. Consider P (K > 4λT ′).
Using the Chernoff bound for the T-R Poisson point process yields:
P (K ≥ 4λT ′) ≤ e
−2λT ′ (2λT ′e)4λT
′
(4λT ′)4λT
′ =
(e
4
)2λT ′
(20)
Thus, for any 0 < ζ < 1, if λT ′ is large enough,
P (K ≥ 4λT ′) < ζ
2
(21)
Now, consider P (F ∩ {K ≤ 4λT ′})
P (F ∩ {K ≤ 4λT ′}) = P (F |K ≤ 4λT ′ )P (K ≤ 4λT ′) (22)
≤ P (F |K ≤ 4λT ′ ) (23)
≤ P (F|K = k′) |k′=4λT ′ (24)
where P (F|K = k′) is the probability of “failure” given the total number of received and transmitted
packets in T ′ is k′, and (24) follows from (23) because P (F|K = k′) is a monotonically increasing
function of k′. This is true since with m initial packets, if the total number of received and transmitted
packets increases, the probability of “failure” increases.
To calculate P (F|K = k′), we model the T-R Process by a one-dimensional random walk. Suppose
that there is a random walker on the z axis that is initially located at the origin z = 0, and walks
at each step from z to either z + 1 or z − 1 with equal probability. If Alice transmits a packet, the
walker’s location is increased by 1, and if Alice receives a packet, the walker’s location is decrease by
1. Given Alice has m packets before starting this process, the event of “failure” in the T-R Process is
the same as the event that, at some point, the random walker (that has started from origin z = 0) hits
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state z = m+ 1. Clearly, this can only happen if the walker steps from state z = m to state z = m+ 1
at some point. Since the number of times that Alice either receives or transmits a packets in a duration
of time T ′ is the same as the number of steps of the walker K:
P (F|K = k′) = 1− Pm(k′) (25)
where Pm (k′) is the probability that the walker’s location remains x ≤ m during the first k′ steps. From
(Eq. (12.13) in [38]):
lim
k′→∞
Pm (k′) = erf
(
m√
2k′
)
(26)
where erf (·) is the error function. By (17),
lim
T→∞
Pm(k′)|k′=4λT ′ = erf
(
m√
8λT ′
)
= erf
(

√
2λψT√
8λ(1− ψ)T
)
(27)
= erf
(

2
√
ψ
1− ψ
)
(28)
By (24), (25), (28)
lim
T→∞
P (F ∩ {K ≤ 4λT ′}) ≤ lim
T→∞
P (F|K = 4λT ′) = 1− lim
T→∞
Pm (k′)
∣∣∣
k′=4λT ′
1− erf
(

2
√
ψ
1− ψ
)
.
Therefore, if
ψ
1− ψ =
(
2

erf−1
(
1− ζ
2
))2
(29)
where erf−1 (·) is the inverse error function,
lim
T→∞
P (F |{K ≤ 4λT ′}) ≤ ζ
2
. (30)
Therefore, by (21), (30) Alice can achieve Pf < ζ for any 0 < ζ < 1 and thus the transmission is
reliable.
(Number of Covert Bits) Alice’s rate of packet transmission in the second phase is λ and the capacity
of the queue for conveying information through inter-packet delays is [25, Theorems 4 and 6].
C(λ) = λ log
µ
λ
nats/sec (31)
Since the length of the second phase is T ′ = T (1 − ψ), the amount of information that Alice sends
through inter-packet delays is C(λ)T (1− ψ) = O (λT ).
(Size of the Codebook) Finally, to complete the construction, we find the number M of codewords
in the codebook. According to [25, Definition 1], the rate of the codebook is logM
T ′ =
logM
T (1−ψ) . Since
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the capacity of the queue at output rate λ is the maximum achievable rate at output rate λ (see [25,
Definition 2]), by (31), the size of the codebook is
M = e(1−ψ)λT log (µ/λ) (32)
where 1− ψ =
((
2

erf−1 (1− ζ))2 + 1)−1.

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered two scenarios of covert communication on a timing channel. In
the first one, Alice is able to insert her own packets onto the channel but not modify the timing of
other packets. We established that, if the packet transmission between legitimate nodes is modeled as
a Poisson point process with parameter λ, Alice can transmit O
(√
λT
)
packets to Bob in a period of
duration T without being detected by warden Willie. In the converse, we showed that if Alice inserts
more than O
(√
λT
)
packets, she will be detected by Willie. Next, we analyzed the scenario where
Alice cannot insert packets but instead is able to buffer packets and release them onto the channel at
a later time. We showed that if Alice waits ψT before codeword transmission, where ψ = Θ (1), and
buffers packets, she is able to transmit O (λT ) bits to Bob reliably and covertly in time period T , given
Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient length (codebook).
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APPENDIX
a) Proof of fact 1:
D(Pλ1(n)||Pλ2(n)) =
∞∑
n=0
Pλ1(n) log(Pλ1(n))/Pλ2(n)) =
∑
n
Pλ1(n) log
λn1e
−λ1/n!
λn2e
−λ2/n!
=
∑
n
Pλ1(n)
(
log
λn1
λn2
+ λ2 − λ1
)
= (λ2 − λ1) +
∑
n
Pλ1(n)n log
λ1
λ2
= (λ2 − λ1) + log λ1
λ2
E1[N ]
= (λ2 − λ1) + λ1 log λ1
λ2
where E1[K] is the expected value of the Poisson distribution with parameter λ1.
b) Proof of (7): Consider x ≥ 0, f(x) = ln(1 + x), and g(x) = x− x2
2
. Therefore
f ′(x)− g′(x) = 1
1 + x
− (1− x) = x
2
1 + x
≥ 0 (33)
On the other hand f(0) = g(0) = 0, therefore
f(x)− g(x) =
x∫
0
(f ′ (x)− g′ (x)) dx ≥ 0 (34)
Thus, ln(1 + x) ≥ x− x2
2
for x ≥ 0.
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